The Products Liability Crisis: Modest Proposals For Legislative Reform by Bivins, William P., Jr.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
August 2015
The Products Liability Crisis: Modest Proposals
For Legislative Reform
William P. Bivins Jr.
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Legislation Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bivins, William P. Jr. (1978) "The Products Liability Crisis: Modest Proposals For Legislative Reform," Akron Law
Review: Vol. 11 : Iss. 4 , Article 2.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss4/2
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THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY CRISIS:
MODEST PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
WILLIAM P. BIVINS, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTIONIN RECENT MONTHS, it has become commonplace to speak of products
liability litigation in terms of a "crisis" situation.' Whether that character-
ization of the situation is too strong may be a matter of debate, but there
is little doubt that products liability litigation is creating formidable prob-
lems for manufacturers;' and there is considerable evidence to substantiate
the problems which manufacturers and sellers are encountering.
Perhaps the most extensive and wide-ranging study of the products
liability crisis has been undertaken by the Interagency Task Force under
the direction of the U.S. Department of Commerce.' The Task Force was
established to conduct a study of the impact of products liability claims on
the economy. Independent contractor surveys were commissioned and com-
pleted prior to the final report to provide source material and data upon
which the final recommendations of the Task Force were ultimately based.
One such independent survey was the Industry Study, which was completed
*Attorney, Products Liability Litigation, General Motors Corp., Detroit, Mich.; J.D., Southern
Methodist University; A.B., Duke University. The views expressed herein are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of General Motors Corp.
1See Hoenig, Products Liability Problems and Proposed Reforms, 1977 INS. L.J., 214,
n.3. Mr. Hoenig recognizes a possible semantic problem in the term "crisis" but notes
that whatever "label" is applied, the problems remain. Other authors speak in
terms of "crisis." E.g., Irving, Our National Product Liability Crisis and Why You Are a Part
of It, IRON AGE, August 1, 1977, at 81. See also, DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY PosITIoN PAPER (1976); MACHINERY & ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY: A MAPI SURVEY (1976); NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS, NFIB
SURVEY REPORT ON PRODUCT LIABILITY (1977).
2 Numerous surveys have been undertaken by such diverse groups as the Society of Plastics
Industry, the Woodworking Machinery Manufacturers, the Industrial and Heating Equipment
Manufacturers, and the Railway Progress Institute. See 1 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE' ON
PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE
INDUSTRY STUDY, IV-62 to 106 (1977) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRY STUDY].
3 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FINAL RE-
PORT (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. On the basis of the Final Report, the
Office of Management and Budget and the Domestic Policy Staff of the White House re-
quested the Department of Commerce to prepare an "options paper" to review alternative
actions the federal government might undertake in response to the products liability
situation. A paper was prepared, focusing on the three principal areas identified in the
Final Report as the cause of the products liability problem: insurance ratemaking practices,
uncertainties in the tort-litigation system, and the manufacture of unsafe products. See
Department of Commerce Options Paper on Product Liability and Accident Compensation
Issues, 43 Fed. Reg. 14,612 (1978).
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in April, 1977.' In the Industry Study, 337 manufacturers were surveyed
by telephone, products liability surveys by twenty national trade associations
were reviewed, federal and state accident data were analyzed, and discussions
were held with twenty selected firms in "high risk categories, ' in order
to compile data and make recommendations relative to the system under
which manufacturers are held liable for the manufacture of defective prod-
ucts. The findings document the increasing burden which products liability
litigation has placed upon the manufacturer.
The Industry Study showed that the average number of pending claims
per firm surveyed had increased six fold from 1971 to 1976.8 Further, the
cost of products liability insurance coverage had doubled in this same
period from 1971 to 1976.' The average amount of damages sought by
new claims increased from $476,000 in 1971 to $1.7 million in 1976;1 and
average settlements likewise increased for this same period from $12,000
to $28,800. 9
The Industry Study is a compilation of extensive data, with tentative
analyses leading to several broad conclusions and recommendations for
further study. But perhaps the most significant part of the report is the finding
of "no apparent trend in either the relative frequency or severity of injuries
among product categories selected by the Task Force for analysis that would
explain the increase in claims and litigation against manufacturers."" ° Thus
the increasing costs of products liability litigation can be attributed neither
to a higher incidence of defective products nor to increasingly severe en-
4 INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 2. A legal study and an insurance study were also com-
missioned. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-11 to 17.
6 See INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 2, at I-1, 1-2, H1-1 to 6.
6 Id. at 1-8. Among consumer goods, power mowers and automotive components were the
subject of the largest number of pending claims; grinding wheels and industrial machinery
were the subject of the largest number of lawsuits in the product category of "workplace
product group."
7 id. at 1-6. According to trade association surveys, the increase in cost of coverage for the
years 1974-1976 had increased from two to as much as six times over the cost during the
years 1970-1974.
8 id. at 1-9.
9Id.
10 Id. at 1-12. Regrettably, although the Industry Study concludes that the frequency or
severity of injuries occurring through use of a product has not increased, two of the four
"potential remedies" analyzed in the study would have significance only as to reducing fre-
quency of product related injuries; i.e., safety certification of industrial and consumer
products, id. at 1-15, and implementation of mandatory provision for preventative program
services by insurers and insureds (liability prevention program inspections and audits),
id. at 1-16. Of the other two remedies, only one would reduce the amount of litigation, or
limit recovery, i.e., the recommendation that workers' compensation become an exclusive
source of recovery for workplace accidents. Id. at 1-14. The final recommendation would
permit certain financial advantages to manufacturers by means of write-off of contingent
liabilities. Id. at 1-17.
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counters with defective products. Rather, the data shows that increasing
numbers of cases are filed each year, with increasingly costly settlements
or verdicts. The product alone cannot be held accountable for the increased
costs of litigation, nor would safer products solve the problem. In seeking
solutions to the products liability crisis, it is therefore not unreasonable
to look beyond the product, to look to the system by which that product
is determined to be defective.
In its final report, the Interagency Task Force indeed looked at the
system by which a product is determined to be defective and determined
that the system of products liability litigation is one of the three major causes
of the present products liability problem." Uncertainties in the tort litigation
system were noted by the Task Force as a basis for the problem: "It is
almost impossible to predict when courts will change product liability rules
and broaden the exposure of insureds. The instability in product liability
law appears to have increased defense and investigation costs."' 2
While it is clear that the system of products liability litigation must
be reformed, it is also clear that measures of reform must be chosen care-
fully. The consequences of any change must be well understood before
the change is implemented; there is no gain in exchanging one inequity for
another. But the impetus for reform should not come from the manufacturers
alone. The burden of continuing under the present system is borne not only
by the manufacturers and sellers whose rates of insurance or costs of self
insurance have drastically increased, but also by the consumer, whose
choices may become more limited, 3 and surely more costly.' Furthermore,
uncertainty in the law of products liability fosters unnecessary litigation
which puts an additional strain on an already overworked judicial system.
Relief from this social cost would be a gain to everyone, not only manu-
facturers and sellers.
This article will attempt to identify some of the sources of the problems
which are adversely affecting the system of products liability litigation and
will offer proposals for reform within the framework of the law of products
liability.
11 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at xxxix.
12 Id. at xliii.
13 Twenty-three firms (seven percent of those contacted) reported decisions to discontinue
products in the last two years; twenty-six firms decided to postpone the introduction of
new products. INDusTRY STUDy, supra note 2, at 1-10.
14 Average cost of product liability coverage under comprehensive general liability plans
increased from $0.74 per thousand dollars of total sales in 1971 to $2.81 per thousand
dollars of total sales in 1977. Presumably, the increased cost to the manufacturer would be
passed on to the consumer. Id. at IV-33.
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II. SOURCES OF THE PROBLEM
The impetus for reform in the area of products liability may be
seen as a continuation of conflict and controversy in an area of law that
has been volatile for many years. The late Dean Prosser spoke of developing
trends in the law of products liability in terms of a military "assault,"15
more in the nature of a battle than of a systematic, logical development.
Most controversial was the advent of strict liability, which was strongly resisted
by manufacturers and sellers who were depicted by Prosser as defending
the "citadel" of privity.'6 But the development of the law of strict liability
has become only one of the factors which has precipitated the present prod-
ucts liability crisis. Other factors involve the application of the law in the
context of products liability litigation, particularly the "deep pocket" ration-
ale so often applied by judges and juries and the application of needlessly
restrictive rules of evidence as to relevant factors such as use of seat belts,
consumption of alcohol, or collateral sources of compensation for injuries
sustained. Furthermore, the burden of proving the existence of a defect has
often been reduced to a mere recitation of the circumstances surrounding
the occurrence of the accident, with the implication that a defect was
present in the product in issue. Taken together, these trends have caused
excessive verdicts and marked uncertainty in the outcome of trials, reducing
products liability litigation to something of a grand lottery.
A. Development of the Law of Strict Liability
The realization of a long developing trend toward strict liability 7 was
finally accomplished in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,'8 which held
15 Prosser's battlefield phraseology is rather fanciful:
One major bastion, that of negligence liability, has been carried long since, and its guns
turned inward upon the defenders. Another, that of the strict liability of the seller of
food and drink, is hard pressed and sore beset, and may even now be tottering to its
fall. Elsewhere along the battlements there have been minor breaches made, but the
defense is yet stout, war correspondents with the beleaguering army are issuing daily
bulletins, proclaiming the siege is all but over. From within the walls comes the cry,
not so; we have but begun to fight. Watchman, what of the night?
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
16 Many would believe that the battle objective was never limited to taking the "citadel of
privity," but extended to a number of other defenses which, although arguably more
legitimate, have nevertheless fallen away.
17 The development of the law of strict liability has been discussed in a number of writings
over the past years. E.g., Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability,
24 TENN. L. REV. 963 (1957); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791
(1966); Prosser, supra note 12; Traynor, The Ways and Means of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.
L.J. 5 (1965).
is 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). Section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts was published by the American Law Institute as a valid statement of
the law of 1965. Judge Traynor, author of the Greenman decision, was an advisor to the
Institute at the time; Prosser was the reporter for the Restatement. In 1965, there were few
[Vol. 11:4
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that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort where an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.""9 The realiza-
tion was inevitable, even if strongly resisted. The process had started with
the early case of Thomas v. Winchester," proceeded apace in 1916 with
Justice Cardozo's holding in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,21 and
was brought to the point of fruition in 1960 in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors.22
In its broadest terms, the evolution toward strict liability had as its
impetus the restrictive nature of the then-available actions for recovery of
damages occasioned by use of a defective product. The tort-contract dichot-
omy so evident in the early cases was an unnecessary burden. The once
tortious nature of an action for breach of warranty, whose essence was
deceit or misrepresentation, had by the nineteenth century evolved to a
contractual action." The codification of the law of warranty into the Uniform
Sales Act of 1906 insured that it would remain contractual. This cate-
gorization subjected the breach of warranty action to the requirements of
privity and also permitted contractual limitations of warranty, which could
defeat an otherwise valid claim.
With MacPherson the negligence of the manufacturer became action-
able, but with attendant problems of proving a duty on the part of a manu-
facturer and a breach of that duty which resulted in injuries or property
damage. The burden upon the plaintiff to show where the manufacturer
had been negligent was clearly a heavy one; and there could be no recovery
where the manufacturer could not have discovered the defect by reasonable
inspection.'. The cases decided in the intervening years between MacPherson
cases, apart from Greenman, to substantiate the Restatement formulation of section 402A.
Since 1965, the Restatement concept of strict liability has been adopted in all but a few
states. For a review of the current status of acceptance of the doctrine of strict liability
see 1 PROD. LiAB. REP. (CCH) 4070 (1977).
19 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
700.
206 N.Y. 397 (1852).
21 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
22 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
2" Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15-17 (1888); O'Connell, The Inter-
locking Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort, 75 MICH. L. RE,. 659, 660 (1977).
2' A major factor prompting the decision in Henningsen was surely the fact that plaintiff
could not prove negligence on the part of defendant on the sole ground that the subject
automobile had been badly damaged, and there was no evidence other than the testimony
of the injured party. Accordingly, the alternative route of breach of warranty was chosen,
and the presence of a defect was inferred from the circumstantial evidence regarding the
occurrence of the accident. In MacPherson, a negligence theory was utilized because it
was shown that a reasonable inspection by the manufacturer would have disclosed the
presence of defective wood in one of the spokes of a wheel on the subject vehicle. Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motors Co., 217 N.Y. at 385, 111 N.E at 1051.
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and Henningsen attest to the ingenuity of the courts in attempting to resolve
the disparate nature of actions in negligence and breach of contract by
fashioning an equitable result for the parties involved.25
Thus, the widespread adoption of strict liability, as enunciated in
section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, was inevitable in that it
promised a simple solution to the tort-contract dichotomy by joining aspects
of negligence and warranty law together in one action, thereby expanding
allowable recovery under warranty aspects and reducing the formidable bur-
den of proof in negligence. It was an innocent development in itself; there was
no good reason why modem courts should continue to labor under re-
strictive forms of action, much as fourteenth century English courts had
done, when a solution was readily apparent.
Unfortunately, the advent of strict liability was accompanied by public
policy statements which spoke of deflecting the risk of harm from defective
products to those best able to pay. This "risk-spreading" argument main-
tained that "manufacturers, as a group and an industry, should absorb the
inevitable losses which must result in a complex civilization from the use
of their products, because they are in the better position to do so, and
through their prices to pass such losses on to the community at large."2
While not unreasonable on its face, this argument has become the
basis for application of the "deep pocket rationale." This rationale has
affected the proceedings and, ultimately, the outcome of products liability
litigation in that the quantum of proof requisite to show the existence of
a defect has diminished; contributory negligence is not considered a defense
in strict liability; and certain evidentiary rules work to exclude relevant
evidence which would aid the jury in an overall understanding of a case.
These developments have simplified the plaintiff's preparation and presen-
tation of his case, but have left defendants virtually in the position of proving
that the product was not defective.
25 "As the decisions continued, there was an extended period during which courts proceeded
to invent a remarkable variety of highly ingenious, and equally unconvincing, theories of
fictitious agency, third-party beneficiary contract, and the like, to get around the lack of
privity between the plaintiff and defendant." Prosser, supra note 15, at 1124. Twenty-nine
judicial techniques which were utilized by the courts are noted in Gillam, Products Liability
in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 153-55 (1958).
26 Prosser, supra note 15, at 1120. His other arguments for adopting strict liability of manu-
facturers are (a) that the plaintiff may have problems proving negligence against sellers of
the product other than the manufacturer;, (b) that the doctrine of strict liability merely
enforces a standard of care which the "best companies" already maintain; and (c) that
proof of negligence is more uncertain, and adversely affects trial preparation, settlement
nesotiation, and verdiqt amounts, in a way that strict liability does not. Id. at 1116-19.
[Vol. 11:4
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B. Proof of Defect
It has been said that the advent of strict liability has occasioned no
change in the burden of proof which rests with the plaintiff in negligence
actions.2 There seems to be an academic consensus that issues of negligence,
aided by the doctrine of res ipsa locquitur, are no more difficult to prove
than issues of defect in strict liability. If this were true, it would be difficult
to understand the impetus behind the development of strict liability.2" If
a theory of negligence coupled with the doctrine of res ipsa locquitur were
equivalent to proving a defect under strict liability, prior cases surely would
have seized upon this approach rather than distorting legal theories to reach
the desired results.29 But in point of fact, the strict liability theory has changed
the burden of proof; defects may be proved by circumstantial evidence, with
no showing of negligence, and liability is not defeated by a showing of
due care or by counterclaims of contributory negligence which are available
under a negligence theory.2
A number of authors have dealt with proof of defect in a strict liability
context. 1 It is interesting to note that mere evidence of a damaging event,
which occurs in the use of a product, is considered in some instances to
be sufficient evidence of the existence of a defect, particularly where the
27 "Where the action is against the manufacturer of the product, an honest estimate might
very well be that there is not one case in a hundred in which strict liability would result in
recovery where negligence does not." Id. at 1114. "Theories of strict liability have not
materially expanded the liability of the maker of a defective product, although the same
may not be true as to resellers and retailers." Keeton, Manufacturers' Liability: The Meaning
of "Defect" in the Manufacture & Design of Products, 20 SYRAcusE L. REv. 599, 562
(1969).
28 Presser has posited the impetus toward strict liability on considerations of trial preparation,
negotiations for settlement, and verdict amounts which are more speculative under a theory of
negligence. Prosser, supra note 15, at 1114. But when one considers the wide ranging theories
on the kind and quantum of evidence needed to prove a defect, Prosser's arguments seem
illusory, at best. See Keeton, supra note 27, at 563; Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product
Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REv. 325 (1971).
29 See note 25 supra, and accompanying text as to the legal theories.
S3See Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption
of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972). Most courts would follow the view of the Restatement
which, under strict liability, distinguishes between contributory negligence and assumption
of the risk and holds that only assumption of the risk (willful encounter of a known
danger) would be a defense. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n at
356 (1965). However, if plaintiff's negligence is the sole proximate cause of the accident,
this would be a bar to recovery, not because the defendant has asserted a partial or complete
defense to its liability, but because causation has not been shown. See notes 38-56 infra
and accompanying text.
21 E.g., Keeton, supra note 27; Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in
Products Liability, 46 CiN. L. Rlv. 101 (1977); Rheingold, supra note 28; Comment,
Torts - Product Liability - Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Defect, 50 N.C. L. REV.
417 (1972); Note, Products Liability and the Problem of Proof, 21 STAN. L. Rsv. 1777
(1969); Annot. 51 A.L.R.3d 8 (1974).
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probable causes of the event are held to be a matter of common knowledge. 2
Some cases have gone even further, finding liability based on minimal
proofs, unsubstantiated by or even contradicted by expert testimony. For
example, it has been held that plaintiff's testimony that a dry-cell battery
exploded was sufficient to prove the defective condition of the product,
despite expert evidence to the contrary that the chemical substances con-
tained in the battery could not and did not react in an explosive manner;"3
that testimony concerning "vibrations" was sufficient evidence of a defect
in the subject automobile to account for plaintiff's loss of control of the
vehicle, with subsequent injury; 4 and that plaintiff's testimony, with no
corroborating witnesses, that an automobile had "veered uncontrollably"
and that the application of brakes had caused the vehicle to "jump or jerk"
was sufficient to show a defect in the vehicle which caused plaintiff's in-
juries. 5 Other cases have fostered the notion, through dicta, that plaintiffs
32 Keeton, supra note 27, at 564 and cases cited therein; Rheingold, supra note 28, at 328.
Both Keeton and Rheingold categorize types of evidence which plaintiff may utilize in
proving a defect. Keeton includes 1) expert evidence, based upon examination, 2) new evidence
of the occurrence of a damaging event, 3) a combination of expert evidence and evidence as to
the occurrence of the incident, 4) the user's testimony as to the malfunction of a component
part, and 5) evidence negating the existence of possible causes not attributable to the
manufacturer. Keeton, supra note 27, at 564-65. Rheingold indicates broader areas of proof
as to 1) the nature of the product, 2) the pattern of the accident, 3) the "life history" of
the product, 4) similar products and uses, 5) elimination of alternative causes, and 6) the
occurrence of the accident. Rheingold, supra note 28, at 326-37. Keeton's analysis seems
to assume that expert testimony becomes direct evidence of an "identifiable defect," when
in reality expert testimony is often only speculation as to a defect, speculation which relies
primarily upon tentative conclusions about the occurrence of the event itself. Such opinions
are rarely of greater probative value than evidence as to the mere occurrence of the event,
particularly where the "expert" has no experience in the area with which his opinions deal.
33 Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1965) (adopting a theory of
strict liability as enunciated in Greenman).
34 Bollmeier v. Ford Motor Co., 130 Ill. App. 2d 844, 265 N.E.2d 212 (1970). In reaching
its decision, the court was apparently preoccupied with evidence that the subject vehicle
had experienced some vibration problems prior to the incident and that extensive repair
work had been undertaken to solve the problem. The incident in issue occurred when the
owner's son was driving by himself and failed to negotiate a curve properly. There were
no other witnesses to the incident. The court noted "circumstantial evidence.., such as
proof of a malfunction which tends to exclude other extrinsic causes, is sufficient to make
a prima facie case on this issue." Id. at 851, 265 N.E.2d at 217. The court failed to clarify
to what extent "other extrinsic causes" must be excluded. This case therefore upholds broad
guidelines for circumstantial proofs, suggesting that any evidence will be sufficient to get
the case to the jury. It is interesting to note the court's remarks that, based on the evidence,
a negligence theory could not be shown, but that plaintiff could prevail under a theory
of strict liability. This very clearly indicates that the doctrine of strict liability, despite what
Prosser and others may have said, does permit a far more simplistic approach to proofs,
just short of a theory of absolute liability. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
35 Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970). In this case,
the court had nothing more to rely on than plaintiff's testimony that the event occurred.
Not even plaintiff's expert could reach a conclusion as to defect because the car had been
so badly damaged in the accident. There were no other witnesses to the incident which
occurred when plaintiff was driving alone.
[Vol. 11:4
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may prove their cases by mere evidence of the incident."6
The effect of proving a defect by mere proof of the occurrence of the
event is especially prejudicial to defendants in those instances where the
total product or relevant component parts have been destroyed in the sub-
ject accident, and where there is no competent eyewitness testimony. In these
situations, defendants frequently have no means to defend the product
effectively, so that mere submission of the case to a jury often determines
the issue of liability. Since only the plaintiff is capable of presenting evidence,
the jury has little choice but to reach a verdict for the plaintiff." What
has been lost in this process is the realization that evidence is suggestive
of a number of inferences, only one of which may lead to the conclusion
that the product was defective. And where witnesses to the incident are
unavailable or nonexistent, or where the action has come to trial years after
the occurrence, of the incident, production of controverting evidence is
extraordinarily difficult for the defendant.
The result of the trend toward circumstantial proof of defect has been
to render impossible any prediction of the outcome of litigation for de-
fendants in those cases where plaintiff's proofs are extremely weak. Previous
standards of proofs virtually insured that plaintiff would lose if he had no
reasonable proof of defect or negligence. Now, however, almost any evidence
presented by the plaintiff may be sufficient to support a verdict awarding
him extensive damages. The unpredictability of outcome always works
against the defendant: in electing to defend a seemingly unmeritorious case
at trial, a defendant takes a significant risk despite weaknesses in plaintiff's
proofs. This risk has often forced parties to have recourse to settlement of
claims which are otherwise unmeritorious; and the availabilily of settlement
money from reluctant defendants, of course, stimulates the filing of addi-
tional claims.
C. Contributory Negligence
The problems arising out of the permissible proof of defect by circum-
stantial evidence have been exacerbated by the development of the law of
strict liability and its treatment of the defense of contributory negligence."
36 E.g., Greco v. Buccioni Eng. Co., 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969); Elmore v. American Motors
Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); MacDougall v. Ford Motor
Co., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969); Bernal v. American Honda Motor Co.,
87 Wash. 2d 406, 553 P.2d 107 (1976).
1 See, e.g., Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
38 See generally, Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. Ant L.
& COM. 107 (1976); Noel, supra note 30; Schwarz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negli-
gence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974); Annot. 46 A.L.R. 3d 240 (1972).
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It is often said that contributory negligence is no defense to an action in
strict liability. Indeed, comments to section 402A of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts suggest that because strict liability is not based upon the
negligence of the seller, the consumer's own contributory negligence is
therefore not at issue.39 The "logic" of this reasoning, however engaging, is
an academic fabrication that ignores reality. While strict liability may have
removed much of the plaintiff's burden of proving specific acts of negligence
by the defendant, liability always depends on the conduct of the parties: the
defendant's placing of the allegedly defective article in the stream of com-
merce and the plaintiff's conduct in using that article.
Much confusion has resulted from semantic problems attendant upon
use of the terminology "contributory negligence." Problems begin with the
illusory distinction which the Restatement draws between contributory negli-
gence and assumption of the risk. According to the Restatement, contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists
of plaintiff's failure to discover a defect or to guard against its existence. "°
The issue of plaintiff's failure to discover a defect is a narrow one, however,
and is irrelevant where there is no duty on the plaintiff's part to discover or
to inspect for defects. It therefore seems unreasonable that the Restatement
would totally discard the defense of contributory negligence on the sole
premise which few would dispute, that a duty to inspect or discover defects
in a product should not be imputed to the plaintiff. In fact, the defense of
contributory negligence reappears under other labels. The most obvious
defense that has been retained by the Restatement is that of assumption of
the risk: "If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the
danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product
and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery."' 1 The distinction which
the Restatement draws between contributory negligence and assumption- of
the risk is regrettable. Inasmuch as assumption of the risk is really one aspect
of the larger concept of contributory negligence, it seems improper to dis-
card the larger concept in strict liability, while retaining subcategories of
contributory negligence in the form of assumption of the risk.
In addition to assumption of the risk, there are other aspects of con-
tributory negligence which the Restatement would recognize as valid de-
fenses, even though it presents the general position that contributory negli-
gence is no defense. For example, plaintiff's "contributory negligence" may
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n at 356 (1965).
AI0 Id.
A' Id.
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be the proximate cause of the injuring event,"2 as where a plaintiff is driving
under the influence of drugs or alcohol and is injured in a collision with
another automobile, yet claims that the accident occurred because of a
defect in the automobile. In such situations, the plaintiff's negligence should
be a defense to the lawsuit, whether as a contributory negligence defense or
as a proximate cause defense. This approach is perhaps implicit in section
402A, but much confusion has resulted from language that appears to re-
state the law as proscribing any defense of contributory negligence except
that which constitutes assumption of the risk. 3
Another aspect of contributory negligence is the mishandling of the
product by the plaintiff after it has left the hands of the seller. The seller
is not liable when subsequent mishandling of an otherwise safe product re-
sults in the product becoming harmful, ultimately causing injury." As in
the case of contributory negligence which proximately causes the injury,
mishandling of a product becomes another aspect of contributory negligence,
but is not considered in the Comment n treatment of contributory negligence.
Finally, the comments to section 402A allude to a defense of misuse,
though that exact terminology is not found in the comments. Comment h,
for example, recognizes the law that a product "is not in a defective condi-
tion when it is safe for normal handling and consumption."' 5 Other references
to abnormal use, or misuse, are made in Comments i and j. These references
suggest that evidence of plaintiff's misuse should be admissible.
Clearly, the defense of contributory negligence may take on several
forms, not all of which are proscribed by the Restatement, even though Com-
ment n purports to dispose of the contributory negligence defense in strict
liability. By taking the general position that the defense of contributory
negligence no longer has validity in strict liability, the Restatement has
42 The mere presence of a defect is theoretically insufficient to impose liability. Section 402A
retains the requirement that the injury result from the defect, not from the plaintiff's conduct:
"One who sells any product in a defective condition ... is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user. . ... " Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
43 Id. Comment n.
44 The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition, and subsequent
mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time it is consumed. The burden
of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands
of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff and unless evidence can be pro-
duced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not
sustained.
Id. Comment g, at 351.
45 1d. Comment h, at 351 (emphasis added). Examples indicated in this comment include
knocking a bottled beverage against a radiator to remove the cap (abnormal handling),
adding too much salt to food (a rather absurd example of abnormal preparation), and a
child's eating too much candy (abnormal consumption).
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fostered inaccurate assumptions about the law of strict liability. Although
this may seem to be a problem of semantics," the results are serious. Consider
the unacceptable results which have followed from a refusal to consider
contributory negligence as a defense in cases where plaintiff was driving
at excessive speeds or under the influence of intoxicants, 7 or failed to take
proper safety measures when using the product."8 The public policy argument
that defendant sellers and manufacturers must bear the risk of accidents
arising out of the use of defective products should not be followed to the
point where an equally important argument, that the public must become
more mindful of safety, and bear the risk when safety is disregarded, is
excluded from consideration. To this extent the conduct of a user of a product
is important, whether it be called contributory negligence, assumption of the
risk, misuse, mishandling, or contributory fault.
One case which has recognized the validity of applying comparative
negligence in a strict liability context is Butand v. Suburban Marine &
Sporting Goods."9 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of Alaska
expressed its awareness of "theoretical arguments" that the plaintiffs contri-
butory negligence was difficult to compare with the defendant's strict liability,
in that there would be little or no evidence of the seller's conduct to compare
16 See Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 454 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. App. 1970). The court explained
why it preferred the terminology "contributory fault" to "contributory negligence" or
"assumption of the risk":
Some confusion can arise when it appears that contributory fault is of the nature of
assumption of risk when at the same time it it known that assumption of the risk can
sometimes be contributory negligence. The permeation of this area of the law, with
semantic problems, has been noted .... For purposes of clarity and simplicity reference
should be made to the defense under its proper term [contributory fault] even though
it is in the nature of "assumption of the risk."
Id. at 618.
7 DeFelico v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 164, 255 A.2d 636 (1969). Contra, General
Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1969).
48 Anderson v. Klinx Chemical Co., 256 Or. 199, 472 P.2d 806 (1970) (cleaning fluid used
without rubber gloves).
49 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976). Plaintiff was injured while operating a snow machine, equipped
with an allegedly defective pulley guard which had shattered, causing blindness in plaintiff's
left eye. Proofs were adduced that plaintiff had disregarded operating instructions in the
owner's manual, thereby failing to maintain the machine properly. Plaintiff appealed from a
verdict for defendant seller; the first reported appellate decision dealt, inter alia, with the
issue of contributory negligence and seemed to adopt the Restatement theory that there can
only be a defense of contributory negligence where plaintiff had willfully encountered a
known danger. 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975). However, in reversing and remanding the case
for retrial because of the jury instructions as to plaintiff's burden of proof, the court requested
additional briefing on the important question of comparative negligence as a defense in strict
liability, an issue which the court felt should be resolved for this and future cases. After
further briefing and consideration the second appellate decision was rendered, resolving the
issue of comparative negligence. Note, however, that the Butand case did not present the
question of the validity of the defense of the type of contributory negligence encountered
in the drunk driving cases, where the plaintiff's conduct is unrelated to the existence of a defect.
(Vol. 11:4
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 11 [1978], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss4/2
SYMPOSIUM: LEGISLATIVE REFORM
with the evidence of plaintiff's conduct."0 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that
the theoretical difficulty of comparing plaintiffs and defendant's conduct is
more apparent than real. The system of comparative negligence has not been
difficult for courts or juries to administer in cases that have been decided
on a theory of negligence. Comparative negligence would be utilized in the
same manner in cases litigated on a strict liability theory, except that in
strict liability "it would not be necessary to prove that a defect was caused
by negligence."5
In considering the public policy reasons behind strict liability, the
court said that those policies would not be hindered by application of a
theory of comparative negligence, inasmuch as "[t]he manufacturer is still
accountable for all the harm from a defective product, except that part
caused by the consumer's own conduct. '52 In addition, comparative negli-
gence would serve the purpose of "[ameliorating] the harshness of contribu-
tory negligence while balancing the seller's responsibility to the public with
the user's conduct in contributing to his injury."53
The court's reasoning in the Butand decision is not inconsistent with
a remarkable recent decision from the Supreme Court of California which
may well assume landmark status. In Daly v. General Motors Corp., 11 the
California Supreme Court extended a system of comparative fault to actions
founded on strict products liability and abolished concepts of contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk. Daly involved a thirty-six year old
attorney who lost control of his automobile while driving at fifty to seventy
miles an hour on a Los Angeles freeway; the vehicle struck a metal divider
fence. At the point of impact the driver was thrown out of the vehicle
through the door which had opened on the driver's side, and sustained fatal
head injuries. It was alleged that the door latch had been defectively designed,
causing the door to open during impact.
Defendant General Motors sought to show at trial that the Opel auto-
mobile was equipped with a seat belt-shoulder harness restraint system and
a door lock which, if used, would have prevented the injuries claimed. At
issue also was evidence that decedent had been intoxicated at the time of
50 555 P.2d at 43.
51 Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
5 Id.
53 d.
54 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). The decision is also noteworthy for its holding
with regard to proof of defective design. The court decided that the issue of defective design
must be considered with respect to the product as a whole. "Product designs do not evolve
in a vacuum, but must reflect the realities of the market place, kitchen, highway, and shop.
Similarly, a product's components are not developed in isolation, but as part of an integrated
and interrelated whole." Id. at 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
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the accident. Defendants claimed that this evidence was properly admissible
because it showed that the decedent's own conduct caused his death. The
court rejected these contentions since admission of such evidence, without
instructions limiting its effect to the issues of proximate cause and mitigation
of damages, might lead the jury to believe that recovery could be completely
barred." However, the court did adopt a theory of pure comparative negli-
gence whereby a manufacturer or distributor would continue to be strictly
liable for injuries caused by defective products, but the plaintiff's recovery
would be reduced "to the extent that his own lack of reasonable care contri-
buted to his injury."6 Recovery would be computed by having the jury
determine the amount of the plaintiff's damages and the extent to which the
plaintiff's conduct contributed to his injuries; the court would then reduce
the assessed damages by the percentage-of-fault figure supplied by the jury. 7
The reasoning behind the court's decision to adopt comparative fault
is compelling: the goals of strict liability (elimination of problems of proof
of defect, protection of defenseless consumers) are not at all frustrated by
adopting comparative fault concepts, since the plaintiff's recovery will be
only reduced, not completely barred. Nor will substantial impairment of
incentives to produce safe products result, for defendants will still be respon-
sible in strict liability for defective products to the extent that the defect
caused the injury. The Supreme Court of California, in dismissing semantic
arguments in Daly in much the same way that the Supreme Court of Alaska
had done in Butand, said that "[w]hile fully recognizing the theoretical and
semantic distinctions between the twin principles of strict products liability
and traditional negligence, we think they can be blended or accommodated."58
Most importantly, the court believed that fundamental fairness is more im-
portant than doctrinal purity and that it is unfair to cast "upon one party
the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by hypothesis, responsible." 9
The Butand and Daly decisions are worthy of consideration because
they squarely confront the issues of strict liability and contributory negli-
gence and evaluate both legal theory and practical results. The courts
resolved the conflicting issues in a way that is practical, and most importantly,
equitable to both sides. In light of these recent decisions, the Restatement
comments on contributory negligence seem curiously pedantic and out of
place in the context of the courtroom.
5 1d. at 1174, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
56Id at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
67 Id. at 1173, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
58 Id. at 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
591d. at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 67 (4th ed.
1971) ).
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D. State of the Art Defense
Another aspect of the deep pocket rationale has been the general dis-
regard for the age of the product at issue in products liability litigation and
for the state of the art as to design and technology at the time the article
was manufactured. Not infrequently, actions are brought alleging defects in
products that may have been manufactured a number of years prior to the
occurrence of the incident in issue. Trial of the action may not be reached
until still several years later. Yet, often the jury is permitted to determine the
defectiveness of the article based on the technology available many years
after the article has been produced."0 The results are absurd in those cases
which have held manufacturers liable for not utilizing design and production
technology which was nevertheless unavailable or infeasible at the time
of manufacture of the product in issue. As with other manifestations of the
deep pocket rationale, the outcome of litigation becomes unpredictable; the
scope of the manufacturer's responsiblility becomes confused.
E. Evidence as to Collateral Sources of Compensation
One area of products liability litigation which has abetted the
deep pocket rationale has been the collateral source rule, 1 both a rule of
evidence and a rule of damage. As an evidentiary rule, it prevents adducing
evidence at trial as to other sources of recovery and compensation for the
plaintiff's injuries. For example, a jury is not permitted to hear evidence that
a plaintiff has received workmen's compensation for his injury and, accord-
ingly, has suffered neither a total wage loss nor out-of-pocket expenses for
medical care. The plaintiff's presentation of the case at trial will include
proofs as to all manner of damages without considering those recoveries
from insurance or other payments which would mitigate damages. In insur-
ance subrogation claims, the jury may never know that the plaintiff has
been reimbursed for wages and medical costs by his insurer or the insurer
of a negligent driver; out of ignorance and sympathy, the jury may thus
award damages to plaintiff as though there had been no other recovery,
clearly a windfall. The problem is particularly acute in those jurisdictions
where a defendant has no right of action against a joint tortfeasor and so
cannot interplead a proper defendant who may have previously settled with
the plaintiff.
As a rule of damages, the collateral source rule maintains that there
60 See Symposium, The State of the Art Defense in Strict Products Liability, 57 MARQUETrE
L. REV. 649 (1974); O'Donnell, Design Litigation & The State of the Art, 11 AKRON L. REv.
-(1978); Raleigh, The "State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New Look at an Old
"Defense," 4 OHIO NORTHERN U. L. REV. 249 (1977), for further discussion of this problem.
61 See generally Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1478 (1966).
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can be no reduction of plaintiff's allowable damages by taking into account
benefits received from other sources which have partially or wholly com-
pensated plaintiff for his losses. The rule is an old one in American law, and
derives from a period of time prior to extensive insurance coverage and wel-
fare provisions such as workmen's compensation and medicare. The obsoles-
cence of the rule is evident in its presumption that tort recovery is the pri-
mary form of recovery when, in reality, tort recovery today is more often
a windfall to the plaintiff.
Public policy arguments in favor of the collateral source rule are that
a reduction in recovery in accordance with other collateral benefits would
affect the deterrent aspect of tort actions and that a defendant should not be
permitted to profit from the planning or good fortune of a plaintiff who has
purchased insurance or received gratuitous benefits." Yet, when it is con-
sidered that the cost is borne by the public as consumers and as direct or
indirect contributors to workers' compensation, social security, and em-
ployee benefit plans, it can be seen that public policy is not best served
when a plaintiff recovers without regard to prior compensation. And, in line
with the "risk-spreading" justification for strict liability, there is no public
policy to be served in spreading the risk to a manufacturer when it has already
been spread to the insurance company or employer."3 Moreover, application
of the collateral source rule is inequitable in that it gives a false impression
to the jury of financial destitution and hardship, which will unquestionably
be reflected in the final verdict.
F. Effects
The deep pocket rationale with all of its manifestations, some of which
have been considered here, has resulted in creating a tort liability system
which guarantees uncertainty and confusion as to the adjudication of a defect
in a product which is alleged to have caused injury or property damage.
There is uncertainty because it is not known by what standards a product
will be adjudged to be defective, to what extent a plaintiff's conduct in using
the article will be considered by the trier of fact, or, most importantly, the
quantum of damages that will be recoverable. Where there is uncertainty,
almost any claim, however unmeritorious, will have some chance of success
in the system. "Spreading the risk" in this manner increases the expenses of
manufacturers and sellers, which are eventually passed on to the consumers
62 E.g., Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Strand v. Grinnell Auto. Garage
Co., 136 Iowa 68, 113 N.W. 488 (1907); Conley v. Foster, 335 S.W.2d 904 (Ky. 1960);
Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390 (1880); Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light
Co., 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633 (1908).
63 Fleming, supra note 61, at 1547.
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without any benefit to them or to the public. The starting point for legisla,
tive reform must therefore be the elimination of uncertainty coupled with a
concern for the fair adjudication of claims. Statutes of limitations must be
enacted, defenses defined with clarity, and user's conduct placed in issue.
III. PROPOSED REFORMS IN THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A number of proposals for reform in the law of products liability have
emanated from varied sources, including manufacturers,"4 insurers,"' law
professors," and defense counsel. 7 The proposals range from the extremes
of a radical overhaul of the system, represented by Professor O'Connell's
advocacy of an elective no-fault system, to less novel solutions which advocate
reinforcement and clarification of presently existing defenses. In between
these extremes there is a long list of proposals which would seek primarily to
retain the present tort system of liability while modifying certain aspects of
the law in order to reestablish equilibrium in the dynamic struggle between
the opposing parties-manufacturers and sellers on the one side, and buyers
and consumers on the other. Many states have considered such proposals
and are attempting legislative reform." At least six states have already enacted
legislation in the area of products liability."
64 E.g., DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 1.
65E.g., AMERICAN INS. ASS'N, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE: STATUTES DE-
SIGNED TO IMPROVE THE FAIRNESS AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW (1977).
66 E.g., O'Connell, Immediate Solutions to Some Product Liability Problems, 1976 INS. L.J.
683; O'Connell, Alternatives to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance for
Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976); O'Connell, Bargaining for Waivers
of Third Party Tort Claims 1976 W. ILL. L. F. 435; Schwartz, Professor O'Connell's
No Fault Plan for Products & Services: Have New Problems Been Substituted for Old?,
70 Nw. U. L. REV. 639 (1975).
6' E.g., Hoenig, Products Liability Problems and Proposed Reforms, 1977 INS. L. J. 213;
Hoenig, Product Designs & Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U. L.
REV. 109 (1976).
68 Since 1977, proposed statutes have been introduced into the legislatures of eighteen states,
seeking reform in the area of products liability, including the states of California, Delaware,
Florida, Kansas, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
Most of the statutes have sought implementation of statutes of limitation or repose; some
have gone further to legislate additional defenses to products liability litigation; comparative
fault provisions were considered in a few.
69 Act of June 10, 1977, H.B. 1536, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 199 (to be codified at CoLo.
REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-127-5 and 13-21-401 to 405); Product Liability Act of Kentucky, S.B.
119, 1978 Ky. Acts ch. 91 (to be codified at KY. REV. STAT. §§ 411.300-.350); Neb. L.B.
665, 85th Legislature, 2d Sess. (1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.900-.915 (1977); Tennessee
Products Liability Act of 1978; 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 703; Utah Products Liability Act,
S.B. 158, 1977 Utah Laws ch. 149 (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-15-3 to 6).
The Nebraska provisions are probably least effective among this group: actions in strict
liability are limited to manufacturers, only, unless the manufacturer is also a seller or lessor.
Neb. L.B. 665, 85th Legislature, 2d Sess., § 3 (1978). The definition of state of the art ("best
technology reasonably available") is weak. Id. § 4. Extensive reports are required of insur-
ance companies which are of dubious value, but costly to prepare. Id. § 8.
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While it would not be possible to review in detail each of the many
proposals for reform, it is useful to consider areas where there has been
consistent impetus for reform. Typically, those advocating reform have called
for statutes of limitation or repose which would limit or bar certain claims
regarding older products; alteration of rules of evidence which presently pro-
scribe evidence of contributory negligence or collateral sources of compensa-
tion; definition or strengthening of certain defenses, including the state of the
art defense, product modification and alteration, and defenses of compliance
with governmental regulations; limitation or elimination of damages for pain
and suffering or punitive damages; and institution of a comprehensive com-
parative fault system. Other reforms which have been pursued with less
vigor because of their complexity or uncertain effects include Professor
O'Connell's proposals" for mandatory arbitration of product liability claims
and for an elective no-fault system. Elimination of contingency fees in pro-
ducts liability litigation has also been suggested.
A. Statutes of Limitation or Repose
Impetus for reform in this area has come most frequently out of those
situations where defendants have been forced to litigate cases alleging defects
in products which were many years old at the time of injury. For example,
in Green v. Volkswagen of America,"' a sixteen year old Volkswagen van was
claimed to be defective; in Wittkamp v. U.S.,"2 a fifty year old rifle was the
70 Professor O'Connell proposed in one article that workmen's compensation rates should
be raised across the board in return for workers' giving up the right to sue third parties, e.g.,
manufacturers of equipment in the workplace. The employer, however, would retain the
right to sue third parties, the idea being that such litigation between the employer and the
third party could be handled more expeditiously, probably without trial. O'Connell, Bargain-
ing for Waivers of Third Party Tort Claims, supra note 63. Professor O'Connell's proposals
are based on an estimate that 52 percent of all products liability verdicts involve personal
injury already covered by workers' disability compensation benefits. But his proposal seems
to ignore the higher costs of workers' compensation, as required by this proposal, which
might well exceed any benefits to be obtained from these changes. Litigation, or the threat
of litigation, would continue undiminished; there might even result a higher incidence of claims
by employers against manufacturers for reimbursement of compensation benefits paid.
Quite apart from Professor O'Connell's proposals regarding woi'kers' compensation and
products liability is his proposal for an elective no-fault system where manufacturers could
contract with purchasers to pay benefits, probably limited to out-of-pocket expenses, to con-
sumers who are harmed by the product. See O'Connell, Alternatives to Abandoning Tort
Liability, supra note 66. For a criticism of his approach see Schwartz, supra note 66. Neither
of O'Connell's proposals are considered here for the reason that their effects are speculative,
at best and because the implementation of these proposals would be a long-range proposition
with limited application until results could be analyzed, therefore promising no immediate
solutions to an immediate problem.
71485 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1973). Plaintiff, an 11 year old girl, was playing in the vicinity of
the parked vehicle when she caught her finger on the side air vent. The case was remanded
for determination of the issue of whether the child's use of the vehicle was forseeable.
72 343 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1972). After plaintiff purchased the gun, manufactured in
1917, he shortened the barrel, put on a new stock, welded on a new handle and rechambered
the barrel. The court found the plaintiff had not sustained his burden of proof as to warranty
or negligence and that he had been contributorily negligent.
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subject of litigation. Even if such cases are successfully defended, the cost to
the defendant may be great; the outside chances of losing may prompt defen-
dants to attempt some type of settlement.
It is important to distinguish between the two situations which are
sought to be eliminated by these proposals: statutes of limitation attempt to
bar a plaintiff's claim after some passage of time from the occurrence of the
injuring event, whereas statutes of repose attempt to limit or bar a plaintiffs
claim after some passage of time from the date of manufacture or sale of
the product. Statutes of limitation present little controversy for it is well settled
that a plainiff should be required to bring his cause of action within a reason-
able time after the occurrence of the injuring event. The only question is
how long this time period should be. Some states permit up to six years within
which to file a claim, but a maximum of two years seems to be more reason-
able. That period of time gives an injured person ample time to initiate an
action, but does not permit proofs to become so stale as to create almost in-
surmountable problems for the defense.
Statutes of repose present a more difficult problem. Implicit in the argu-
ment that a plaintiff should not be permitted to bring a cause of action on an
old product is the notion that a product cannot be made to last forever, that
the passage of time, with continued use of a product, will result in deteriora-
tion for which, at some point, the manufacturer should not be held liable."3
However, it is difficult to enact a statute which would fairly designate a
period of "repose" for actions on all types of products, for the reason that
products will, of course, differ as to their expected life. The difficulties of
choosing an equitable period of repose have been mitigated by changing the
purpose of the statute from completely barring an action on an old product
to the purpose of simply creating a rebuttable presumption that a product
which is older than the period prescribed by statute is not defective.
Some states have already enacted variations of these proposals. Con-
necticut law contains a statute of limitations which requires actions to be
brought within three years of injury, but no more than eight years from the
date of sale of the product." In March, 1977, the Utah Legislature approved
products liability reform legislation 5 containing, among other provisions, a
73The Supreme Court of Oregon has noted two reasons which justify statutes of repose:(1) evidence regarding the product diminishes as time goes by, which renders defense of the
product difficult; (2) public policy requires that affairs be conducted with a degree of cer-
tainty, "free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability."
Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53 (1974).
74 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a (Supp. 1978). Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) ("pro-
duct liability civil action shall be commenced not later than eight years after the date on
which the product was first purchased for use or consumption").
75 Utah Products Liability Act, S.B. 158, 1977 Utah Laws ch. 149 (to be codified at UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-15-3 to -6).
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statute of limitations restricting actions to those brought within six years
after date of initial purchase or ten years after date of manufacture of an
allegedly defective product. It provides that:
No action shall be brought for the recovery of damages for personal
injury, death or damage to property more than six years after the date of
initial purchase for use or consumption, or ten years after the date of
manufacture, of a product, where that action is based upon, or arises
out of, any of the following:
(a) Breach of any implied warranties;
(b) Defects in design, inspection, testing or manufacture;
(c) Failure to warn;
(d) Failure to properly instruct in the use of a product; or
(e) Any other alleged defect or failure of whatsoever kind or nature in
relation to a product."6
In contrast, legislation in Colorado has recently been enacted which man-
dates only a rebuttable presumption, rather than a complete bar of a cause
of action, in those situations in which an article older than ten years is
claimed to be defective. The statute provides that "[tlen years after a product
is first sold for use or consumption, it shall be rebuttably presumed that the
product was not defective and that the manufacturer or seller thereof was not
negligent and that all warnings and instructions were proper and adequate." 7
This latter approach is preferable because it avoids the inequity of absolutely
proscribing any litigation on a product merely because it is old. How much
a rebuttable presumption will aid a defendant in actual litigation may be
doubtful, but it will at least give added emphasis to the problems of plaintiff's
proof and may have the general effect of deterring litigation.
B. Strengthened Defenses
Many proposals have quite properly considered the importance of ob-
vious defenses which courts have sometimes ignored. These include the
state of the art defense and the defense that a product has been altered or
modified. Courts must be encouraged to accept and give full effect to these
defenses; in this regard legislation may have a positive effect.
76 Id. § 3 (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(1) ). Tennessee provisions limit
product liability actions to those brought within ten years from the date of first sale, or
within one year after the expiration of the anticipated life of the product, whichever is
shorter. Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978, § 3, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 703.
77 Act of June 10, 1977, H.B. 1536, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 199, § 2 (to be codified at
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3)). Kentucky establishes a rebuttable presumption of no
defect if the injury, death or property damage occurs more than five years after the date of
first sale, or more than eight years after the date of manufacture. Product Liability Act of
Kentucky, S.B. 119, 1978 Ky. Acts ch. 91, § 3 (1) (to be codified at Ky. REV. STAT. §
411.350).
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1. State of the Art Defense
With regard to the state of the art defense,"8 it has been proposed that
legislation require that courts take into account the state of design and
technology at the time the product was manufactured. Several states have
considered such provisions. Typically, this is accomplished by creating a
rebuttable presumption that a product is not defective if it conforms to the
state of the art at the time of manufacture. For example, recently
enacted Colorado legislation provides a rebuttable presumption that a product
was not defective, or that the manufacturer or seller was not negligent, if the
product "[p]rior to the sale by the manufacturer, conformed to the state of
the art, as distinguished from industry standards, applicable to such product
in existence at the time of sale. '" The effect of the presumption will be to
reinforce the probative value of evidence of conformance with the state of
the art in existence at the time of manufacture and will provide a basis in
law for appeal should the evidence regarding compliance with the state of
the art technology have been ignored.
2. Defense of Product Modification
Statutes delineating the defense of product modification or alteration
will likewise have the effect of reinforcing an important defense, permitting
a basis for appeal if evidence as to product modification has been ignored.
As with the state of the art defense provisions, some states have enacted
provisions to give full legal effect to this defense; others will doubtless follow.
Along with other products liability reform measures, the Utah Legislature has
recently enacted a provision which protects a manufacturer or seller of a
product from liability in the situation where injury has resulted from use of
a product that has been altered or modified. The Utah statute provides that:
No manufacturer or seller of a product shall be held liable for any
injury, death or damage to property sustained as a result of an alleged
defect, failure to warn or protect or failure to properly instruct in the
use or misuse of that product, where a substantial contributing cause
of the injury, death or damage to property was an alteration or modifi-
cation of the product, which occurred subsequent to the sale by the
manufacturer or seller to the initial user or consumer, and which changed
the purpose, use, function, design, or intended use or manner of use
of the product from that for which the product was originally designed,
tested or intended. 0
78 See note 60 supra, and accompanying text.
79 Act of June 10, 1977, H.B. 1536, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 199, § 2 (to be codified at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 (1) (a) ). See also Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978,
1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 703, § 5; Product Liability Act of Kentucky, S.B. 119, 1978 Ky.
Acts ch.- 91, § 3 (2) (to be codified at Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.310).
80 Utah Products Liability Act, S.B. 158, 1977 Utah Laws ch. 149, § 5 (to be codified at
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Recently enacted Oregon legislation also provides a defense to a product
liability action where alteration or modification of the product has occurred.
The alteration or modification becomes the basis for a defense if it was
a "substantial contributing factor," which is similar to the requirements of
the Utah provision, but Oregon adds the provision that if the alteration or
modification was reasonably forseeable, the manufacturer or seller must have
given adequate warnings in order for the defense to be valid.81 Although
the courts in Utah and Oregon will need to develop reasonable definitions
of "substantial contributing factor," the very terminology suggests compari-
son of acts or omission of parties on both sides, so that comparative fault
provisions would best facilitate the implementation of the defense.
The importance of legislation which provides a product modification
defense cannot be doubted in light of such unfortunate decisions
as Hopkins v. General Motors Corp.2 There the jury found that the
lock-out system on the carburetor of a pickup truck manufactured by the
defendant had failed to operate properly. This malfunction caused plaintiffs
vehicle to go out of control and overturn, and the plaintiff was gravely in-
jured in the accident. The jury returned a verdict, left undisturbed on appeal,
for $1,760,000. What is disturbing about this case is that the carburetor was
found to be defective, despite proof showing that the carburetor had been
removed by the plaintiff for about one week, then reinstalled on the subject
vehicle prior to the incident. In reinstalling the original carburetor on the
truck, plaintiff made some eleven alterations to the original installation, in-
cluding failure to connect the choke rod, burring the end of the lock-out
pin, using a nail instead of a cotter pin in the main accelerator rod linkage,
and using other improper parts for the installation. The outcome in Hopkins
might well have been different had there been legislation giving effect to the
defense of product modification. In Hopkins, the modification was clearly
a substantial contributing factor which should not have been ignored.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-5). See also Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978, 1978 Tenn.
Pub. Acts ch. 703, § 9; Product Liability Act of Kentucky, S.B. 119, 1978 Ky. Acts ch. 91,
§4 (1) (to be codified at KY. REV. STAT. § 411.320).
81 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.915 (3) (1977).
82 535 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976), afl'd, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). See Note, The
Defense of Misuse and Comparative Causation in Products Liability, 14 Hous. L. REv. 1115
(1977), which discusses the Hopkins court's comparison of plaintiff's misuse or alteration and
defendant's defective product, both of which contributed to the injuring event. It would seem,
however, that the court was not applying a comparative causation theory, but rather had
rejected the evidence that the modifications were the proximate cause of the injury. That
the jury and the appellate courts would disregard the modification is incredible. The case is
noteworthy as an example of how a jury, overcome with sympathy for the plaintiff, will
often disregard substantial evidence in reaching a verdict. An appellate court has difficulty
overturning such a verdict if there is any reasonable evidence to support the jury's finding.
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3. Compliance with Governmental Standards
Finally, there have been proposals to establish compliance with govern-
mental standards as a defense to a product liability action. The Kansas
Supreme Court recognized this defense in Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc.,8 hold-
ing that:
We think the same rule should apply to standards set by the legislature
(or by regulations having the effect of law) as to those set by an indus-
try. Compliance is evidence of due care and that the conforming product
is not defective, and may be conclusive in the absence of a showing
of special circumstances. Certainly a manufacturer should be able to
rely on such standards in the absence of actual or constructive notice
that they are inadequate.'
The Restatement approaches the problem from the opposite direction,
taking the position that compliance with legislative or administrative regul-
lations "does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man
would take additional precautions." 5 However, the comments indicate that,
in the absence of "special circumstances," legislative standards may be
sufficient to meet requisite standards of care.86 Thus, the Restatement and the
Jones case are consistent in their assessment of a proper defense of compliance.
Legislative enactments which would provide for the defense of compli-
ance with governmental standards, consistent with the Restatement approach,
could be effective provisions in products liability litigation. The effect would
be to legislate a rebuttable presumption that a product was not defective
which complied with governmental standards relating to the part or com-
ponent of the product which is alleged to be defective. Proof of compliance
would require the opposing party to prove that the standard was not sufficient.
As with defenses previously considered, a legislative enactment assuring a
defense of compliance with governmental standards would, at the least, pro-
vide a good basis for appeal if evidence of compliance were disregarded at
the trial level.
The Utah Legislature has enacted provisions establishing a rebuttable
presumption that a product made in conformance with governmental stand-
83219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976). In Jones, plaintiffs sought damages for injuries as
a result of a propane gas explosion. At issue was the level of the odorization of the gas,
which could have provided warning of a gas leak. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that
the manufacturer's compliance with state standards was evidence of due care, although negli-
gence could be proved by showing that a reasonable person would have taken additional
precautions.
4Id. at 632, 549 P.2d at 1390.
8 5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 288C (1965).
"Old. Comment a.
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ards is free from defect."' The defense is applied when it is shown that the
allegedly defective aspect of the subject product (whether design, testing,
warning or manufacture) in fact conformed to governmental standards regu-
lating that particular aspect of the product. The Colorado Legislature has
enacted similar provisions which create a rebuttable presumption that the
product was not defective if the product "[c]omplied with, at the time of sale
by the manufacturer, any applicable code, standard, or regulation adopted or
promulgated by the United States or by this State, or by any agency of the
United States or of this State.. 8 Both provisions are examples of legislation
which can be effective in reinforcing defendants' position in litigation in
which the plaintiff claims that a product is defective, even though it con-
formed to governmental standards. This defense is particularly important in
the situation where the defendant manufacturer has been required to con-
form its designs and production to government standards of questionable
merit.89
C. Comparative Fault Systems
For products liability reform to become truly effective, the presently
limited areas of inquiry within products liability litigation must be expanded
to include all relevant evidence of plaintiff's behavior and defendant's acts
or omissions which may have combined to produce the injuring event and
evidence of the nature and extent of injuries suffered, so that the trier of fact
can reasonably determine liability and damages. One approach to these ends
would be the implementation of comparative fault provisions.
Comparative fault provisions have been proposed to remedy the unac-
ceptable situation in strict liability which does not permit evidence of plain-
tiff's contributory negligence to be considered at trial.9" Such provisions
attempt to place plaintiff's conduct in issue as well as defendant's, so that
all aspects of the injuring event may be properly weighed by the trier-of-fact.
Because of the semantic problems with contributory negligence as it relates
to strict liability,9' these proposals have been termed contributory fault or
comparative responsibility systems. For those jurisdictions which have already
87 Utah Products Liability Act, S.B. 158, 1977 Utah Laws ch. 149, § 6 (to be codified at
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6 (3) ).
8 8 Act of June 10, 1977, H.B. 1536, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 199, § 2 (to be codified at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 (1) (b) ). See also Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978,
1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 703, § 4.
89 An example of this type of regulation is federally mandated standards from the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, with which all manufacturers of motor vehicles must
comply. A manufacturer should not be liable if it has been required to comply with standards
which are later determined to be defective.
90 See notes 38-48 supra and accompanying text.
91 See note 46 supra,
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adopted theories of comparative negligence,9" the transition to comparative
fault will not be difficult. For those states which have no form of compara-
tive negligence, the impetus for reform is strong, not only for actions in negli-
gence, but also in strict liability.
One form of a comparative fault statute is contained among a group of
products liability reform preposals recently before the General Assembly of
Pennsylvania. The effect of the comparative fault statute would be limited to
actions in strict liability.9" The proposed statute provides that:
(a) In any product liability action in which recovery is sought on the
basis of strict liability in tort, the responsibility of the person suffer-
ing the harm shall not bar recovery for the harm sustained unless
it was as great as the responsibility of the party against whom re-
covery is sought. However, any damages allowed shall be dimin-
ished in proportion to the amount of responsibility attributable to
the person recovering.
(b) The court may, and when requested by either party shall, direct
the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount
of damages and percentages of responsibility attributable to each
92 United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (admiralty) (pure compara-
tive negligence); Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975) (pure); Nga Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (pure); Hoffman v.
Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (pure); Federal Employer's Liability Act. 45 U.S.C.§ 53 (1970) (pure); ARK. STAT. ANN. H§ 27-1763 to 27-1765 (Supp. 1977) (modified); CoLo.
REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1974 & Supp. 1976) (modified); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h
(West Supp. 1978) (modified); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.06 (West 1964) (recovery of dam-
ages from railroad company); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 66-402 (1966) (action against railroad
by employee), 94-703 (1972) (injury by railroad), 105-603 (1968) (standard of diligence);
HAwAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976) (modified); IDAHO CODE H9 6-801 to 6-803 (Supp. 1977)(modified); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a, 60-258b (1976) (modified); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
14, § 156 (Supp. 1977) (no recovery if claimant is equally at fault); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1977) (modified); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp.
1977) (modified); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972) (pure); MONT. REV. CODE H9 58-607.1,
58-607.2 (Supp. 1977) (modified); NED. REv. STAT. § 25-1151 (1975) (recovery not barred
if "contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the defendant
was gross in comparison"); NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.141 (1977) (modified); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1975) (modified); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:15-5.1 to 2A:15-5.3 (Supp.
1977) (modified); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975) (modified); N.Y. Civ. PAc. LAw§ 1411 (McKinney 1976) (pure); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, H§ 11, 12 (West Supp. 1977)(modified); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1975) (modified); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2101(Purdon Supp. 1977) (modified); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1977) (pure); S.D.
COMPrLED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1969) ("contributory negligence slight in comparison with
the negligence of the defendant"); TEx. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978)(modified); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37, 78-27-38 (1977) (modified); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1977) (recovery not barred if contributory negligence "not greater
than the casual negligence of the defendant"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (1973)(modified); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1978) (modified); WYo. STAT. § 1-1-
109 (1977) (modified). See generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 367-94
(1974).
93 Presumably, the previously enacted Pennsylvania comparative negligence statute, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2101 (Purdon Supp. 1977), would not be affected by this legislation.
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party; and the court shall then reduce the amount of such damages
in proportion to the amount of responsibility attributable to the
person recovering."
The Pennsylvania proposal is a modified comparative fault provision
in that the plaintiff is barred from recovery in those situations where plain-
tiff's own fault exceeds that of the one from whom recovery is sought. A pure
comparative fault system would permit recovery, but would diminish the
damages by the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff even if plain-
tiff's fault exceeded defendant's (thus permitting a situation where, for
example, a plaintiff 90 percent at fault could still recover ten percent from
the opposing parties). The modified approach seems preferable, inasmuch
as a situation where plaintiff recovers something, even though he is more at
fault, seems anomalous. In such a case, it is really the plaintiff's conduct that
caused the injury, and the manufacturer should be relieved of liability on
causation grounds.
The importance of comparative fault proposals is underscored in recent
work by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
to draft a Uniform Comparative Fault Act. The Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws have drafted a proposed Uniform Comparative Fault Act which
utilizes a form of pure comparative fault.9" The draft merits consideration
in the context of products liability reform.
In furtherance of the policy in favor of having the jury consider all
relevant factors contributing to an injury, including the plaintiff's role in the
incident, statutes should also permit or require submission of special ques-
tions to the jury to clarify their findings on the ultimate issues of liability
and damages. This procedure would enable the court to determine whether
the jurors have understood the limitations placed on the plaintiff's recovery.
94 S.B. 585, § 11, General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Session of 1977 (as amended, Nov.
2, 1977).
95 See Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act-What Should It Provide? 10 J.L. REF.
220 (1977). Professor Wade indicates that one basis for choosing a '"pure" comparative
fault system over a "modified" system is that "the pure form always divides the total loss
according to the established fault percentage, while the modified form fluctuates wildly and
very unfairly." Id. at 225. Examples are utilized to show the arithmetic of pure versus modified
systems; however, the examples used assume two individuals who seek recovery from each other,
both of whom are injured by each other's negligence. The "wildly" fluctuating comparison results
from Wade's comparison of the recovery of each relative to total damages sustained, rather than
the percentage of recovery of each relative to the damages suffered only by that individual.
The examples are further unrealistic in that they do not consider the situation which
actually exists in a products liability case, where the plaintiff encounters only a product
rather than another individual who, though negligent, may also have been injured by the
plaintiff's contributory negligence. Because products liability cases do not involve counter-
claims of injury by the defendant manufacturer, the chances for "wild fluctuation" of
results under comparative fault are minimized.
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D. Bifurcation of Jury Trials
Proposed legislation in a few states has sought to guarantee the right
of a party to product liability litigation to have separate trials on the issues
of liability and damages. Such proposals recognize the inherent tendency of
juries to be swept away with sympathy when issues of extent of damages,
often entailing proof of tragic facts, are mixed with complicated issues of
causation and defect. Bifurcation of jury trials is a simple, but effective,
approach to insure a careful evaluation of relevant facts as to liability without
the emotion of damage proofs.
The procedure of separate trial of separate issues is not, of course, a
new one. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize the procedure of
separate trials "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice,""8 but
Rule 42(b) is permissive, not mandatory. A judge is not required to grant
separate trials of separate issues upon motion of either party.9" In contrast,
proposed reforms concerning products liability litigation would insure that
either party has the right to separate trials on the issues of liability and
damages. One statute that has been proposed in Pennsylvania provides that:
The jury before whom any product liability action is tried shall ascer-
tain their verdict as to liability. After such verdict is recorded and before
the jury is permitted to separate, the court shall proceed to receive such
additional evidence not previously received at the trial as may be rele-
vant and admissible on the question of damages and shall permit such
argument by counsel, and deliver such charge as may be just and proper
in the circumstances. The jury shall then retire and consider what
damages shall be awarded and render such verdict accordingly.9"
A modification of the approach taken in Pennsylvania might permit
separate trials upon motion of either party, rather than mandating it in all
products liability cases. Whatever the form, it is clear that this procedural
guarantee will eliminate much of the prejudicial evidence as to liability which
is occasioned by proof of damages.
09 FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (b) provides that
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of
any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always
preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
9T A court may even deny separate trials where parties have stipulated for separate trial of
issues. Rockaway Pix Theatre v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, FED. R. SERV. 2d 42b.22, Case 1
(E.D.N.Y. 1963). See generally 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 42.03 (2d ed. 1977).
98 S.B. 585, § 12, General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Session of 1977 (as amended Nov.
2, 1977).
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E. Other Reforms: Damages for Pain and Suffering; Punitive Damages
In addition to the foregoing proposals, there are other measures of
reform which should be considered which would be effective in bringing
about a more equitable and stable system of determining liability for defec-
tive products. High on this list would be reform in the area of damages for
pain and suffering and punitive damages. Both of these types of damages are
major factors in the unpredictability of the outcome of products liability
litigation because these damages bear little, if any, relationship to compensa-
tory damages such as medical expenses or loss of wages. However, legislating
changes in these areas will be difficult. The issues are complex, both as to
methods by which damages are determined, and as to the rationale or need
for such damages.
In terms of unpredictability of outcome in products liability litigation,
it is clear that punitive damages pose by far the greater problems. Punitive
damages promise a huge recovery to the plaintiff if necessary proofs can be
adduced at trial. And payment of a verdict that may be as high as multiple
millions of dollars9 is not the only cost suffered by the defendant. The lure of
such a high recovery has prompted plaintiffs' counsel to engage in extensive
discovery proceedings on the chance of acquiring damaging documents or
other information which will support an award of punitive damages in addi-
tion to general and specific damages. Accordingly, costs of litigation are
vastly increased. Insurance rates for defendants must then be increased to
cover both higher litigation expenses and a potential award of punitive dam-
ages. Because the amount of punitive damages that might be assessed can
only be guesswork, insurance rates reflect the uncertainty by anticipating
larger verdicts.
99 Perhaps the most startling example of the multi-million dollar verdict in a product
liability case occurred recently in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., Nos. 197761, 199397
(Orange Cty. Sup. Ct., Cal., filed Feb. 6, 1978), awarding compensatory damages of
$2,841,000 and punitive damages of $125,000,000 (thirteen year old sustained severe burns
when a 1972 Pinto was struck from the rear, bursting into flames), noted in 21 ATLA L.
REP. 136 (1978). On a motion to amend judgment nunc pro tunc or to vacate judgment,
plaintiffs were required to accept a punitive damage award reduced to $3,500,000 or a new trial
on all issues. They elected to accept the reduced award. The case is now on appeal to the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals. Id., order dated Mar. 30, 1978. Other examples include Maxey v.
Freightliner Corp., No. CA-3-76-1204-G N.D. Texas, filed Apr. 21, 1978) (actual damages of
$150,000 and punitive damages of $10,000,000 for wrongful death of driver and passenger; fuel
tank of large diesel truck found defective; motion to deny punitive damages upheld); Day v.
Sturm Ruger & Co., No. 72-669 (Alaska Super. Ct., filed May 27, 1976) (twenty-eight year old
suffered partial disability of leg following gunshot wound when he dropped defective gun,
causing it to go off; $100,000 general and special damages, $2,900,000 punitive damages),
noted in 19 ATLA NEws LETr=R 359 (1976); Runnels v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods.,
Nos. 218450, 224532, (Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct., Cal., filed May 25, 1976) ($510,000
compensatory and $511,000 punitive damages awarded to doctor who suffered loss in his
medical practice and other damages following malpractice action by patient whom doctor
had treated with drug manufactured by defendant company), noted in 19 ATLA NEWS
LETTER 310 (1976).
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Punitive damages have been discussed in a number of writings,"' most
of which have justified such damages on several grounds: that they permit
civil punishment of conduct which is rarely or never punished under criminal
law, or of conduct which is not criminally punishable;' that they are a
means to recover costs of litigation and attorneys' fees, a recovery otherwise
proscribed by American civil procedure;'.. and finally, that punitive damages
act as an incentive for plaintiffs to bring "petty cases of outrage and oppres-
sion" into court for redress which otherwise might not be worth the time
and trouble to litigate. 3
The punishment theory may be well applicable in a case involving a tort,
such as malicious prosecution, which suggests some sort of specific intent
on the part of the defendant. However, liability for harm resulting from a
defective product is generally conceded to result without a showing of fault,
and in such a context civil punishment is inappropriate. Given the lower
standard of proof required for plaintiff to prevail, imposition of punitive dam-
ages is inequitable. If quasi-criminal conduct is truly at issue, defendants
should have the protection of standards of proof required in criminal cases.
Nor should defendants be forced to litigate criminal issues concurrently with
issues of products liability, or be subject to recurring verdicts of punitive
damages in different cases involving the same product-a form of double
jeopardy not permitted under criminal law. And finally, if criminal conduct
is evident, there is no reason why plaintiff should profit from this if he has
already been adequately compensated. Rather, such awards should be paid
to society as a criminal fine.
If punitive damages are only a recovery of attorneys' fees not otherwise
recoverable under typical rules of civil procedure, those rules should be
changed, and punitive damages should be labeled "attorney fees." There is
no need to foster the deceit that punitive damages are assessed to punish
criminal or near-criminal conduct of the defendant. This approach might
be embarrassing to plaintiffs' counsel, but it would be a more honest way to
handle these damages.
100 See generally, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 9-14 (4th ed. 1971); Lam-
bert, The Case for Punitive Damages (Including Their Coverage by Liability Insurance),
35 AM. TRIAL LAW A.L.J. 164 (1974); Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 1173 (1931); Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J.
216 (1960); Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV.
1257 (1976); Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300
(1972); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957);
Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages,
41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158 (1966).
101 Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Repraisal of Punitive Damages,
41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158, at 1173-76 (1966).
102 W. PROSSER, supra note 100, at 11; Lambert, supra note 100, at 169.
203 W. PROSSER, supra note 100, at 11.
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Finally, surely few would argue that the potential plaintiff needs any
incentive to bring his grievance with the offending product to the courts.
The high verdicts now rendered in even the smallest cases would be ample
inducement to the reluctant plaintiff.
Legislation which would limit recovery of punitive damages to a speci-
fied multiple of the total of general and special damages might be a tem-
porary solution to the problem of punitive damages, but ultimately decisions
will have to be made as to the need for punitive damages in products liability
litigation. As governmental agencies increasingly assume the role of protect-
ing the consumer by assessing fines and penalties against the manufacturers
and sellers and by requiring adherence to agency regulations, the role of
punitive damages would appear to be diminishing.
Damages for pain and suffering are unquestionably justified, yet they
cause problems in products liability litigation because of the uncertainty
which they engender. How can one logically assess such damages in terms
of a monetary figure? The jury's award is based largely on sympathy for the
plaintiff and may bear no relationship to other, more easily calculated dam-
ages proven at trial. As with punitive damages, a solution might be to limit
recovery for pain and suffering to a specified multiple of the total of other
damages assessed.
Much of the lottery aspect of products liability litigation derives from
the assessment of punitive damages and damages for pain and suffering-
an assessment made in the charged atmosphere of courtroom tensions, which
have little relationship to defective products or monetary damages. The assess-
ment of punitive damages and damages for pain and suffering in products
liability litigation is an area ripe for careful study and reform; there are no
easy answers, but solutions must be worked out which will be equitable to
plaintiff and defendant alike.
IV. CONCLUSION
Developments in the law of products liability have become the source
for a number of problems which now challenge the system by which products
are determined to be defective. The "risk-spreading" argument which origi-
nally formed the justification for strict liability has now become the basis for
a pervasive "deep-pocket" rationale which has mechanistically resolved com-
plex legal issues in favor of the consumer or buyer. This trend is noted in
several areas: the ease with which a defect may be proven, the refusal to
consider plaintiff's conduct in using a product, the diminishing bases of de-
fense for the manufacturer or seller, and the consequent high, unpredictable
verdicts which result from the uncertainties in the law.
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SYMPOSIUM: LEGISLATIVE REFORM
There would seem to be little question, based on the experiences of
manufacturers and sellers as documented by the recent Task Force Report,
that reform measures are necessary to return predictability and equity to the
system. Those who see proposed reform as benefiting only the manufacturer
or seller are mistaken. The ultimate costs for an unworkable products liability
system will be borne by the consumer in the form of higher prices resulting
from increasingly higher and more frequent adverse verdicts and in the form
of diminished competition, as businesses unable to bear the cost of products
liability litigation are forced to close their doors.
But it is also clear that the reforms should be chosen with care and
that results should be carefully reviewed. Reasonable reform will be effective
without abrogating the remedies available to one who claims to have been
harmed by a defective product. These reforms would include adoption of
concepts of comparative fault in strict liability; limitation of time within
which product liability actions may be brought, both with respect to the
date of manufacture of the product and date of the occurrence of the injur-
ing event; strengthening of defenses when defendant proves that it has com-
plied with governmental regulation or with state of the art at the time of
manufacture, or that the product has been modified or misused by the plain-
tiff; elimination of restrictive rules of evidence as to collateral sources of
recovery; and reformulation of concepts of damages for pain and suffering
and punitive damages.
A number of states have already begun the task of reform; other states
will doubtless follow. The results will unquestionably increase the effective-
ness of the system of products liability litigation. Reformation in the system
of products liability litigation is proceeding apace.
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